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Comments

Algorithms & Instruments: The Effective
Elimination of New Jersey’s Cash Bail
System and Its Replacement
David J. Reimel III*
ABSTRACT
“In the American criminal justice system, wealth—not culpability—
shapes outcomes”
– The Equal Justice Initiative.
Until 2017, every state conditioned pretrial release on cash bail.
Judges across the United States predicted the risk individuals posed of
failing to appear and the danger to the community. As a result, indigent
individuals waited in jails merely because they could not afford their bail.
In 2017, New Jersey spearheaded the movement to change how the bail
system operates by passing the Criminal Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”),
which created an objective decision-making tool called the Public Safety
Assessment.
Today, New Jersey judges are no longer required to speculate about
the future decisions of individual defendants. Instead, the Public Safety
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020. I would
like to thank my wife, Karly Reimel, for her support throughout writing this Comment,
and, my parents, for the examples they set in their academic careers. I would also like to
thank my colleagues at the Penn State Law Review for their advice and support throughout
the Comment-writing process.

193

CMT 1 - ALGORITHMS & INSTRUMENTS (DO NOT DELETE)

194

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

10/22/2019 4:40 PM

[Vol. 124:1

Assessment provides a tool for judges throughout the state to uniformly
assess the risks based on statistical data. The CJRA uses algorithms and
statistical calculations, from which judges use a Decision-Making
Framework to determine whether bond is appropriate and the terms and
conditions of that bond. The CJRA has virtually eliminated monetary bond
entirely.
Two years later, in 2019, both New Jersey’s pretrial jail population
and crime rate have decreased. Furthermore, judges can rely on analytics
that remove the guesswork from bail decisions. Most importantly, no one
in the state of New Jersey is incarcerated prior to trial for the sole reason
of indigency.
This Comment will recommend that states abandon a
predominantly cash bail framework and use New Jersey’s risk assessment
tool. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that adopting New Jersey’s
framework will decrease the pretrial jail population, decrease the crime
rate, and ensure that no individual is incarcerated prior to trial for the sole
reason they are indigent.
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INTRODUCTION

Prior to 2017, the New Jersey Constitution guaranteed “[a]ll
persons . . . before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or [the] presumption great.”1
Recently, following the enactment of the Criminal Justice Reform Act
(CJRA), the “sufficient sureties” language was removed and replaced by
a bail system that de-emphasized cash bail.2 Presently, all individuals
charged with a crime in New Jersey can be released from prison without
providing the “sufficient sureties” formerly required under the cash bail
system.3
The cash bail system directly impacted Mustafa Willis (Mr. Willis),
one of many individuals who called for cash bail reform in New Jersey.4
Mr. Willis was 24-years-old when he was arrested in 2010 for unlawful
possession of a firearm.5 The judge set Mr. Willis’s bond at $50,000.6
Given the high price, Mr. Willis’s family could not afford to pay his bond
outright.7 Mr. Willis could not even afford to pay 10% ($5,000) of that
amount to a bail bondsman8 to be released.9 Unexpectedly, Mr. Willis
learned that there was a surveillance video showing a police officer
planting the firearm that ultimately landed him within the criminal justice
system..10 However, Mr. Willis was unable to obtain the tape to confirm
his innocence because he was incarcerated.11 Four months later, the judge
adjusted Mr. Willis’s bond amount to $30,000.12 After the adjustment, Mr.
Willis’s family was able to scrape together enough cash to pay the
bondsman.13 After Mr. Willis posted bail, he was able to obtain the
surveillance video that confirmed his innocence.14
By the time Mr. Willis earned his freedom, the damage had already
been done. In Mr. Willis’s case, he had lost his job due to his arrest, and

1. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2014).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See
Jon
Schuppe,
Post
Bail,
NBC.COM
(Aug.
22,
2017),
https://nbcnews.to/2wzB7mM.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Crystal Ignatowski, What is a Bail Bond & How Do They Work?,
SURETYSOLUTIONS.COM, https://bit.ly/2ZzAaWR (last visited Jan. 16, 2019) (explaining
how bail bonds work in a cash bail system).
9. See Schuppe, supra note 4.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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therefore, repaying the bondsman proved nearly impossible.15 Moreover,
after Mr. Willis’s arrest and release from jail, he struggled to find work,
which added to the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining a source of
income.16 Mr. Willis ultimately sued the Newark Police Department and
his case settled for $6,000.17 Most of the settlement money, however, was
used to repay his family, after being charged for a crime he did not
commit.18
In 2013, the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) conducted a study in an
effort to analyze the problems that individuals like Mr. Willis faced with
cash bail in New Jersey.19 The study illustrated, on a mass scale, the
number of individuals incarcerated while awaiting trial.20 Following the
study’s release, Governor Chris Christie urged the legislature to enact a
bail reform bill in New Jersey.21 One year later, the New Jersey legislature
passed the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) with bipartisan support.22
Around the same time, New Jersey also elected to amend the New Jersey
Constitution23 to reflect the missions and goals of the CJRA.24
In passing the CJRA, the goal of the New Jersey legislature was
three-fold: (1) assure the defendant appeared in court; (2) protect the
citizens in the general population; and (3) prevent the “obstruction of
justice by persons awaiting trial.”25 To accomplish these goals, the CJRA
required the selection of a Risk Assessment Instrument,26 which would
uniformly assess all defendants and express those assessments in an easily
15. See id.
16. See Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Winning Bail Reform in New Jersey, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE,
https://bit.ly/2Mll5Tr (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
20. See Marie VanNostrand, New Jersey Jail Population Analysis: Identifying
Opportunities to Safely and Responsibly Reduce the Jail Population, LUMINOSITY 13 (Mar.
2013), https://bit.ly/2sDT0Oe.
21. See Michael Aron, Christie Signs Bail Reform Bill, NJTV NEWS (Aug. 11, 2014,
5:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2VZaqCa.
22. Id.
23. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended).
24. See generally N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11. Prior to the amendment, N.J. CONST. art. 1
§ 11 stated: “All persons . . . before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great[.]” N.J. CONST. art. I,
§ 11 (amended 2014). This language meant that any person charged with a non-capital
crime could not be detained without bail. See also New Jersey Pretrial Detention
Amendment, Public Question No. 1 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2U5NcIY (last
visited Nov. 20, 2018). The amendment allows pretrial detainment without cash bail.
25. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716 (D.N.J. 2017).
26. A Risk Assessment Instrument is a tool used to “help judicial officers make
informed decisions on who to release and who to detain” in the context of criminal law.
John Etienne Myburgh et al., Review of Pretrial Risk Assessment and Factors Predicting
Pretrial Release Failure, CTR. FORENSIC BEHAV. SCI. & JUST. STUD. 1, 19 (2015),
https://bit.ly/2mtqqj6.
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digestible format for the courts.27 The Risk Assessment Instrument that the
New Jersey Courts adopted was the Public Safety Assessment (PSA).28
The PSA analyzes three separate scores: (1) the Failure to Appear
(FTA) score; (2) the New Criminal Activity (NCA) score; and the (3) New
Violent Criminal Activity (NVCA) flag.29 These scores are then analyzed
by the courts to determine if, and on what terms, a defendant may be
released during pretrial proceedings.30
Despite the CJRA, opponents of bail reform remain skeptical.31 For
example, June Rodgers (Ms. Rodgers) “blamed bail reform for the murder
of her son.”32 Ms. Rodgers’s son was shot and killed following a “verbal
dispute with a man in a car.”33 Police officers arrested the man in the car,
who had been arrested four days earlier and subsequently released with no
cash bail.34 Without bail reform, the man who shot Ms. Rodgers’s son may
not have been released from jail due to his prior arrest. Despite such
terrible incidents, many have celebrated the CJRA because indigent
individuals are not incarcerated merely because they cannot afford cash
bail.35
New Jersey is the first state to effectively eliminate cash bail and
create a Risk Assessment Tool to calculate a defendant’s likelihood to
appear, likelihood to commit a crime, and likelihood to commit a violent
crime.36 This Comment will analyze whether states should adopt similar
bail reform.37
Part II of this Comment will discuss New Jersey’s prior cash bail
system,38 the goals of the CJRA, and how the PSA accomplishes these
goals.39 Part II will also discuss the three components of the PSA-including
the Failure to Appear score, the New Criminal Activity score, and the New

27. Id.
28. The Public Safety Assessment is an administrative tool designed to predict the
likelihood that a defendant will or will not (1) appear in subsequent court appearances and
(2) be a danger to the community, if released. See Public Safety Assessment: A Risk Tool
That Promotes Safety, Equity, and Justice, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Aug. 14,
2017), https://bit.ly/2zdn4ni [hereinafter Public Safety Assessment].
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Sarah Wallace, ‘Nobody’s Afraid to Commit Crimes’: Cops, Victims Blast
Overhaul of NJ Bail System, NBC N.Y. (May 18, 2017, 9:38 PM), https://bit.ly/2T4yPEx.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See Lessons for the Nation: New Jersey’s Cash Bail Overhaul (Brave New Films
2017), https://bit.ly/2TalevH.
36. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Section II.A. This Comment will not give an in depth analysis of cash
bail generally, as states widely differ in its application.
39. See infra Section II.B.

CMT 1 - ALGORITHMS & INSTRUMENTS (DO NOT DELETE)

198

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

10/22/2019 4:40 PM

[Vol. 124:1

Violent Criminal Activity flag. Finally, Part II will analyze how judges
use the PSA within the Decision-Making Framework (DMF)40 and the
ways in which the law allows prosecutors and judges to bypass the
Decision-Making Framework in certain instances.41
Next, Part III will analyze the impact of bail reform on New Jersey’s
pretrial jail population and crime rates.42 Part III of this Comment will also
emphasize the importance of re-evaluating the static risk factors of the
PSA every three to five years to account for unique crimes and new
empirical studies.43 Then, Part IV will recommend that all states adopt bail
reform similar to New Jersey’s model.44 Last, Part V will provide
concluding remarks on the issues addressed throughout this Comment.45
II.

BACKGROUND

Upon arrest and commitment to a county jail, a defendant in New
Jersey is required by statute to appear before a judge within 48 hours.46
During this first appearance, the judge sets conditions for pretrial release
pending trial.47 Before the CJRA was implemented in 2017, the condition
for pretrial release was “sufficient sureties,” commonly known today as
cash bail.48
Under the previous cash bail system, defendants could post bail in
several ways. If defendants had the required funds available, then they
could simply pay the court.49 When defendants did not have the funds,
they had to rely on family and friends or find a bail bondsman.50 A bail
bondsman would agree to pay the cash bail required, but then charge
defendants a fee, which was usually a percentage of the bond.51 If
defendants could not afford to pay a bail bondsman a percentage of the fee

40. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
41. See infra Section II.D.
42. See infra Sections III.A., III.B.
43. See infra Section III.C.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. See infra Part V.
46. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(b)(1) (West 2017).
47. See id.
48. See N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2014).
49. See How Do Bail Bonds Work?, SPEEDYBAILBONDS, https://bit.ly/2TXPt8S (last
visited Nov. 3, 2018).
50. Id.
51. Id. The percentage of the fee is usually 10% of the total cash bond owed to the
court. See Ignatowski, supra note 8. The rest of the cash bond will be secured by the bail
bondsman in the form of collateral, such as a car or jewelry. After the case concludes, so
long as the defendant has arrived at all court proceedings, the bond is released, and the bail
bondsman recoups the fee originally obtained from the bond release. If the defendant does
not arrive at all court proceedings then the bond is forfeited and the bail bondsman will use
the collateral obtained to recoup the rest of the bail amount. Id.
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or find another means to pay the cash bond, then defendants were required
to stay in jail pending trial.52
In 2014, however, the New Jersey legislature proposed a significant
change to the cash bond process with the CJRA—a new system without a
cash bail requirement and instead analyzes a defendant’s criminal history
to determine whether a defendant should be released.53
A.

New Jersey’s 2014 CJRA

In 2013, the Drug Policy Alliance54 released a study addressing the
demographics of individuals incarcerated for drug use in New Jersey.55
The study showed that on any given day in 2012, approximately 13,003
inmates were detained in county jails throughout New Jersey.56 Of the
13,003 inmates, approximately 9,492 were detained because they were
either awaiting sentencing or trial; approximately 5,006 inmates were in
custody because they could not afford bail; approximately 1,560 inmates
were in pretrial custody because they could not afford bail set at $2,500 or
less; and approximately 800 inmates could not afford to post bail for
approximately $500 or less.57
Given these statistics, the study concluded that the “greatest
opportunities to responsibly reduce New Jersey’s jail population are
related to more efficiently and effectively managing the pretrial
population.”58 Shortly after the study’s release, the New Jersey legislature
took steps to reform bail.59
Following the study’s release, Governor Chris Christie urged
lawmakers to reform New Jersey’s “broken” bail system.60 Governor
Christie wanted voters to decide on a state constitutional amendment that
would allow “judges to deny bail to offenders who pose a threat to safety,
a flight risk, or could obstruct justice.”61 Then, in August of 2014,

52. See Robert Greenwald, What Happens if You’re Too Poor to Pay Bail?, THE
NATION (Mar. 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2FHhSx9.
53. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16 (West 2017).
54. The Drug Policy Alliance “envisions a just society in which the use and regulation
of drugs are grounded in science, compassion, health and human rights, in which the people
are no longer punished for what they put into their own bodies but only for crimes
committed against others.” Vision & Mission, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE,
https://bit.ly/2Doa3de (last visited Jan. 12, 2019).
55. See VanNostrand, supra note 20, at 13.
56. See id. at 8.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 715 (D.N.J. 2017).
60. See Aron, supra note 21 (clarifying that “[t]hree quarters of the people . . . being
warehoused in our jails were there awaiting trial rather than serving a sentence and their
average length of stay is about [ten] months”).
61. Id.
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Governor Christie signed the CJRA into law.62 Three months later, the
people of New Jersey voted to amend the New Jersey Constitution to
remove the requirement of “sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses
when the proof is evident or presumption great.”63 In January of 2017, the
CJRA was enacted into law.64
B.

The Goals of the CJRA and How it Changed Pretrial Procedure

The CJRA seeks to endorse three separate goals in consideration of a
defendant’s pretrial release: (1) assure the defendant appears in court; (2)
protect the citizens in the general population; and (3) prevent the
“obstruction of justice by persons awaiting trial.”65 To accomplish these
goals, the CJRA modified New Jersey’s criminal justice system to permit
judges to order pretrial detention for defendants if there is “clear and
convincing evidence that no condition [of release] or combination of
conditions [of release] can reasonably assure” the goals of the CJRA.66
The CJRA also moved New Jersey from a cash bail system that was
“resource-based”67 to a bail system that “relies upon an objective
evaluation of an individual defendant’s level of risk.”68

Id.

62. See id.
63. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2014). The amended Constitution states:
All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release. Pretrial
release may be denied to a person if the court finds that no amount of monetary
bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary
bail and non-monetary conditions would reasonably assure the person’s
appearance in court when required, or protect the safety of any other person or
the community, or prevent the person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct
the criminal justice process.

64. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15 (West 2017).
65. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716 (D.N.J. 2017); see also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:162–15. The statute states:
[The CJRA] shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of primarily
relying upon pretrial release by non-monetary means to reasonably assure an
eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the
safety of any other person or the community, that the eligible defendant will not
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, and that the eligible
defendant will comply with all conditions of release.
Id.
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15,—18(a)(1). Clear and convincing evidence is
“[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.”
See also Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
67. A resource-based cash bail system is one that relies on a defendant’s own
financial resources to post cash bail. See Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 716.
68. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17.
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Under the CJRA, an “eligible defendant,”69 upon arrest, is detained
for no more than 48 hours.70 Within those 48 hours, a Pretrial Services71
Program (Pretrial Services) completes a risk assessment analysis,
including “recommendations on conditions of release.”72 After the risk
assessment analysis is complete, Pretrial Services makes a
recommendation to the judge, and the judge then determines whether the
defendant will remain detained or be released from jail pending trial.73 The
judge is required to make this “pretrial release decision” within 48 hours
of incarceration.74
The CJRA permits the presiding judge to choose between five
conditions for pretrial release: (1) release on one’s own recognizance75
(ROR); (2) release by use of non-monetary conditions;76 (3) release by
cash bail;77 (4) release by a combination of monetary bail and nonmonetary conditions; and (5) detain in jail pending trial.78
The first option, an ROR, is the least restrictive means of
enforcement.79 ROR means a defendant is released without specific
conditions to ensure the defendant returns to court.80 On the other end of
the spectrum, the fifth option, detaining a defendant in jail until trial, is the
most restrictive.81 To determine which of the five options to apply, the
judge analyzes an objective Risk Assessment Instrument, which uses
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15 (“A person for whom a complaint-warrant is
issued for an initial charge involving an indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense
unless otherwise provided in [the CJRA].”).
70. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17.
71. Pretrial services is defined as “[a]n investigation of a . . . criminal defendant’s
background, conducted after the defendant has been arrested and charged but before trial,
to help the court determine whether to release or detain the defendant pending trial.”
Pretrial Services, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72. Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 717.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Release on Recognizance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The
pretrial release of an arrested person who promises . . . in writing but without supplying a
surety or posting bond, to appear for trial at a later date.”).
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17(b)(2) (Non-monetary conditions include
“remain[ing] in the custody of a designated person,” “maintain[ing] employment . . . or
actively seek[ing] employment,” “abiding by . . . place of abode,” “report[ing] on a regular
basis to a designated law enforcement agency,” “comply[ing] with a specified curfew,”
“refrain[ing] from possessing a firearm,” “refrain[ing] from excessive use of alcohol,” or
“return[ing] to custody for specified hours following release for employment”).
77. In 2017, only forty-four defendants were required to post cash bail as a condition
for release. See Criminal Justice Reform Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J.
JUDICIARY 4 (2017), https://bit.ly/2PxUIdB [hereinafter Criminal Justice Reform Report].
78. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(b)(2).
79. See id.
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16. A judge can only make a determination of
pretrial detention if the prosecutor has made a motion for pretrial detention.
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statistics to predict the future behaviors of defendants if granted pretrial
release.82 In New Jersey, the chosen Risk Assessment Instrument is the
PSA.83
C.

New Jersey’s Risk Assessment Instrument: The PSA

The PSA84 embodies the policy goals of the CJRA.85 The PSA
assesses three factors: (1) a Failure to Appear score (FTA score); (2) a
New Criminal Activity (NCA) score; and (3) a New Violent Criminal
Activity (NCVA) flag.86
1.

The FTA Score

The FTA score is calculated by measuring a variety of static risk
factors87 that determine the likelihood that a defendant will appear at court
proceedings prior to trial.88 A raw score is calculated from these static
factors and then transferred to a six-point scale.89 If the defendant has a
pending charge at the time of the offense, the defendant receives one
point.90 If the defendant has a prior conviction, the defendant receives one
point.91 If the defendant has failed to appear at a pretrial hearing within the
past two years, the defendant receives one point.92 If the defendant has
failed to appear two or more times within the past two years, however, the
defendant receives four points.93 Finally, if the defendant has a prior
failure to appear to a pretrial hearing older than two years, the defendant
receives one point.94

82. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(a).
83. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
84. The Public Safety Assessment was approved by the Administrative Director of
the New Jersey courts under the CJRA. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—25(c)(1) (West
2017).
85. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15.
86. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. An FTA score analyzes the
likelihood that a defendant will appear in court at all pretrial proceedings. See id. An NCA
score analyzes the likelihood a defendant will commit additional crimes while awaiting
trial. See id. An NVCA Flag will alert the judge if the defendant is more likely to commit
a violent offense while awaiting trial. See id.
87. “Static risk factors are features of the [defendants’] histories that predict
recidivism but are not amenable to deliberate intervention, such as prior offences.”
Research Summary, Giving Meaning to Risk Factors, 15 PUB. SAFETY CAN. 1, 1 (Nov.
2010), available at https://bit.ly/2P1ArS6.
88. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
89. See id. Every factor calculated in the assessment is a static factor.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
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Once the static risk factors are evaluated, the points are added
together to create a raw score.95 The raw score is then converted to a sixpoint scale.96 The raw scores of 0, 1, 2, 3—4, 5—6, and 7 convert to a
scaled FTA score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively.97 A defendant with a
raw score of six is considered the least likely to appear at a pretrial hearing,
while a defendant with a raw score of one is considered the most likely to
appear at a pretrial hearing.98 In addition to the FTA score, the PSA also
calculates the NCA score.
2.

The NCA Score

The NCA score is calculated by measuring a variety of static factors
that determine the likelihood that a defendant will commit a crime while
on pretrial release.99 Similar to the FTA score, the NCA score is a raw
score calculated from static risk factors and then transferred to a six-point
scale.100
If the defendant is under the age of 23, the defendant receives two
points; if the defendant is over the age of 23, the defendant receives zero
points.101 If the defendant has a pending charge at the time of the offense,
the defendant receives three points.102 If the defendant has a prior
misdemeanor conviction, the defendant receives one point.103
Furthermore, if the defendant has a prior felony conviction, the defendant
receives one point.104 If the defendant has one or two prior violent
convictions,105 the defendant receives two points.106 However, if the
defendant has three or more prior violent convictions, the defendant

95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
98. Id. There is a 16% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 1.
N.J. PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL 8 (Dec. 2016), https://bit.ly/2SqiuxQ [hereinafter Pretrial
Justice Manual]. There is a 19% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score
of 2. Id. There is 25% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 3. Id.
There is 37% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 4. Id. There is a
53% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 5. Id. Last, there is a 65%
chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 6. Id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. “‘Violent Crime’ means any crime in which the actor causes death, causes
serious bodily injury [] defined by statute, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a
deadly weapon. [It] also includes any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which
the actor uses, or threatens . . . immediate . . . physical force.” State v. Parolin, 793 A.2d
638, 642 (N.J. 2002); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11—1 (West 2017).
106. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.

CMT 1 - ALGORITHMS & INSTRUMENTS (DO NOT DELETE)

204

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

10/22/2019 4:40 PM

[Vol. 124:1

receives two points.107 If the defendant missed a court proceeding one time
within the past two years, then one point is added to the raw score.108
However, if the defendant failed to appear for a court proceeding more
than once within the past two years, then two points are added to the raw
score.109 Last, if the defendant has a prior sentence of incarceration, the
defendant receives two points.110
Similar to the FTA score, the raw NCA score is converted to a sixpoint scale with a six considered to be the most likely to commit a crime
while on release and a one considered to be the least likely to commit a
crime while on release.111 The raw scores of 0, 1—2, 3—4, 5—6, 7—8,
and 9—13 correlate to a scaled NCA score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6,
respectively.112 After the NCA score is calculated, Pretrial Services must
screen defendants to flag for new violent criminal activity.
3.

The NVCA Flag

Unlike the FTA and NCA scores, the NVCA flag is based on many
static factors, but the raw score for the NVCA flag is not converted to a
six-point scale.113 Rather, the NVCA flag becomes either a “flag” or “no
flag” designation.114 The NVCA flag cautions judges against allowing a
defendant’s release without strict conditions.115 Under the CJRA, a
defendant with an NVCA flag has a much lower likelihood of receiving a
pretrial release given the severity of crimes that are deemed “violent.”116
The static factors used to develop a raw score for an NVCA flag are:
(1) whether the defendant has a current violent offense; (2) whether the
defendant has a current violent offense and is under the age of 21; (3)
whether the defendant has a pending charge at the time of the offense; (4)

107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. There is a 14% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release
with an NCA score of 1. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 9. There is a 25%
chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release with an NCA score of 2. Id. There
is a 31% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release with an NCA score of
3. Id. There is a 38% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release with an
NCA score of 4. Id. There is a 46% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on
release with an NCA score of 5. Id. There is a 50% chance a defendant will commit a crime
while on release with an NCA score of 6. Id.
113. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
114. Id.
115. See Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 719 (D.N.J. 2017).
116. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43—7.2 (West 2017).
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whether the defendant has a prior conviction; and (5) whether the
defendant has a prior violent conviction.117
Unlike the FTA and NCA scores, the raw NVCA score simply is
converted to a “yes” or “no” designation as to whether an NVCA flag is
applied.118 If an NVCA flag is applied to a defendant, judges are less likely
to grant release.119 Raw scores of 0—3 convert to a “no,” which means an
NVCA flag is not applied.120 Raw scores of 4—7 convert to a “yes,” which
means an NVCA flag is applied.121 Whether a defendant receives a raw
score of seven, the highest possible raw score, or four, the lowest possible
raw score, is irrelevant because a judge cannot consider the score
underlying the NVCA flag.122
Moreover, age can play a prominent factor in determining whether a
defendant receives an NVCA flag. For example, a defendant under the age
of 21 with a violent offense and a pending charge at the time of the offense
will automatically receive an NVCA flag under the PSA.123 By contrast, a
22-year-old defendant in the same situation will not receive an NVCA flag
at all.124 As such, two individuals one year apart in age charged with the
same crime can receive vastly different pretrial release determinations
because the NVCA “flags [younger] defendants as posing an elevated risk
of [n]ew [v]iolent [c]riminal [a]ctivity . . . during the pretrial release
period.”125 After the FTA, NCA, and NCVA have been calculated, the
scores are analyzed under a decision-making framework (DMF).126
D.

The Decision-Making Framework

The DMF takes the three PSA scores and provides a uniform
recommendation for release conditions.127 The DMF can be broken down
117. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. If a defendant has a (1) current
violent offense, then two points are added to the NVCA raw score. Id. If a defendant has a
(2) violent offense and is under the age of 21, then one point is added to the NVCA raw
score. Id. If a defendant has a (3) pending charge at the time of the offense, then one point
is added to the raw score. Id. If the defendant has a (3) prior conviction, then one point is
added to the raw score. Id. Finally, if a defendant has (4) one or two violent conviction,
then one point is added, however, two points are added if a defendant has three or more
violent convictions. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 10.
120. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 9.
126. The Decision-Making Framework (DMF) “produces a recommendation for a
judge about conditions of release or detention.” Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at
10.
127. Id.
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into four separate phases.128 First, Pretrial Services calculates the PSA
scores and recommends to the judge particular conditions the defendant
should face while awaiting trial.129 The agency can recommend that the
defendant be either ROR130 without any conditions or not ROR.131 If
Pretrial Services recommends the defendant not be ROR, then the agency
can recommend release based on special conditions in a tiered format:
“PML 1”; “PML 2”; “PML 3”; “PML 3+”; and “detained.”132
PML 1 is the least restrictive tier and only requires that the defendant
“report to a pretrial services officer by phone once per month.”133 PML 2
is slightly more restrictive and requires a defendant to “report to a pretrial
services officer once a month in person, once a month by telephone, and
be subject to monitored conditions such as a curfew.”134 PML 3 is
relatively restrictive and requires that a “defendant [be] monitored inperson or by phone every week, and [be] subject to additional monitored
conditions.”135 PML 3+ requires the defendant to be subject to all of the
conditions described in PML 1, PML 2, and PML 3, plus it requires a GPS
monitoring device and home confinement.136 The agency can also
recommend that the defendant not be released at all.137
Regardless of the PSA’s tiered matrix, the court can determine on its
own whether charges are so serious that “release [is] not recommended; if
released[, the defendant should receive] maximum conditions,”
irrespective of the PSA and Pretrial Services recommendations.138 A court
can disregard the PSA recommendation for the most serious charges,
which include “murder, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual
assault, and carjacking.”139 Furthermore, if the charged crime is considered
“violent” and the defendant has an NVCA flag, then the court can decide
to incarcerate the defendant until trial, irrespective of the PSA.140
Next, the court applies the FTA and NCA scores to a DMF matrix.141
An ROR order is recommended if the FTA and NCA scores are either 1 or

128. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 719 (D.N.J. 2017).
129. Id.
130. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17(b)(2).
131. See Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 719.
132. See id. “PML” stands for “Pretrial Monitoring Levels.” See Pretrial Justice
Manual, supra note 98, at 10.
133. See Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 719.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. PML 3+ means “Electronic Monitoring” or “Home Detention.”
137. Id.
138. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 10.
139. Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 719.
140. Id.
141. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 10.
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2.142 A PML 1 order is recommended with an FTA score of 2 and an NCA
score of 3.143 A PML 1 order is also recommended if the FTA score is 3 or
4 and the NCA score is 2 or 3.144 A PML 2 order is recommended if the
FTA score is 5, but the NCA score is 2 or 3.145 A PML 3 order is
recommended if the FTA score is 5 and the NCA score is 4.146 A PML 3
order is also recommended if the FTA score is either 2, 3, or 4, but the
NCA score is 5.147 A PML 3+ order is recommended if both the FTA score
and NCA score are 5.148 Last, release is not recommended if both the FTA
and NCA scores are 6.149
Fourth, the court determines whether the defendant was charged with
a No Early Release Act (NERA) crime not addressed in the above crimes
that recommend no release regardless of the PSA.150 If the defendant was
charged with a NERA crime, then the recommended release conditions
increase by one level.151
After Pretrial Risk Services applies the PSA scores to the DMF
matrix, they make a recommendation for the judge to consider during the
preliminary hearing.152 The CJRA, however, has allowed room for the
courts to address individualized circumstances of individual defendants
irrespective of the PSA when considering pretrial release for defendants.153
E.

The CJRA Addresses Potential Problems with the PSA

Before a New Jersey court will order pretrial detention, a prosecutor
must first apply for the detention.154 Next, the government must prove
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43—7.2 (West 2017).
151. NERA crimes include:
[1] vehicular homicide; . . . [2] aggravated assault; . . . [3] disarming a law
enforcement officer; . . . [4] kidnapping; . . . [5] robbery; . . . [6] aggravated
arson; . . . [7] burglary; . . . [8] extortion; . . . [9] booby traps in manufacturing
or distribution facilities; . . . [10] strict liability for drug infused deaths; . . . [11]
terrorism; . . . [12] producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents
or nuclear or radiological devices; . . . [13] racketeering, when it is a crime of the
first degree; . . . [14] firearms trafficking; or . . . [15] causing or permitting a
child to engage in a prohibited sexual act, knowing that the act may be
reproduced in any manner, or be part of an exhibition or performance.
§ 2C:43—7.2.
152. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(a).
153. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—19.
154. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—19 (West 2017) (indicating that the prosecutor may
only apply for detention if the specific crime is eligible for pretrial detention).
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“that the eligible defendant committed the predicate offense” at a pretrial
detention hearing.155 The defendant must be present at the hearing and
must be represented by counsel.156 If the defendant is indigent, then
counsel must be appointed. 157 At the preliminary hearing the defendant
has the right to “testify, present witnesses, cross-examine any of the
prosecutor’s witnesses, and present information by proffer.”158 After
hearing the evidence presented, the court may only order pretrial
detainment if it finds by “clear and convincing evidence that no amount of
monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release[,] or [a]
combination of money bail and conditions” adequately ensures public
safety, prevents obstruction of justice, or the defendant’s appearance in
court.159
When a court detains a defendant after a pretrial detention hearing,
the judge must “include written findings of fact and a written statement of
the reasons for detention.”160 By contrast, when a court orders a
defendant’s release following a pretrial detention hearing, the judge must
“provide an explanation in the document that authorizes the eligible
defendant’s release.”161 A defendant can appeal a pretrial detention ruling,
which must be “heard in an expedited manner.”162
Finally, if there has been a “material change in circumstance that
justifies a change in conditions,” the Superior Court of New Jersey may,
on its own motion or by a motion from either party, “review the conditions
of pretrial release.”163
The CJRA has successfully transitioned to a risk-based system
through implementing the PSA and the DMF. New Jersey’s bail reform

155. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—19(e)(2).
156. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–19(e)(1).
157. Id.
158. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 720 (D.N.J. 2017); see also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:162–19(e)(1).
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–18, –19(e)(1). The statute also states:
The court may take into account information concerning . . . a. [t]he nature and
circumstances of the offense charged; b. [t]he weight of the evidence against the
eligible defendant, except that the court may consider the admissibility of any
evidence sought to be excluded; c. [t]he history and characteristics of the eligible
defendant . . . d. [t]he nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person or
the community that would be posed by the eligible defendant’s release, if
applicable; e. [t]he nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting
to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the eligible
defendant’s release, if applicable; and f. [t]he release recommendation of the
pretrial services program obtained using a risk assessment instrument.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—2.
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–21(1).
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–23.
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–23(a)(2).
163. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:26–2(c)(2) (West 2017).
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has been an effective model for other states because the CJRA adequately
balances risk and contains measures for independent judicial decisionmaking to handle potential flaws with the PSA.164 Additionally, two years
following the enactment of the CJRA, the pretrial jail population has
significantly dropped along with an unprecedented drop in crime.165
III. ANALYSIS
As New Jersey leads the nation in bail reform through legislation
enacted in 2017, many states are following suit.166 For example, in 2018
Alaska enacted similar bail reforms and established a quantitative
algorithm to make bail decisions.167 Additionally, the California Supreme
Court declared cash bail as unconstitutional in 2018.168 Given recent state
trends, Risk Assessment Instruments such as the PSA should serve as the
model for bail reform in other states.169
Following the first full year of bail reform, “New Jersey has become
a national leader in [bail] reform.”170 Defendants no longer wait in jail
pending trial solely because they cannot afford cash bail. The CJRA has
successfully reduced the crime rate as the PSA ensures that defendants at
risk of endangering the public stay incarcerated while allowing less
dangerous defendants to return to the general population.171
Given the success of the CJRA in New Jersey, state legislatures
should enact bail reform and use New Jersey as a model. Adopting New
Jersey’s PSA would (1) reduce the pretrial jail population and (2) reduce
the crime rate.172 Despite initial success, however, static factors used by
states as a basis for algorithms, such as the PSA, should be periodically reevaluated to ensure Risk Assessment Instruments continue to accomplish
state goals.173

164. See infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 171, 186 and accompanying text.
166. See Alaska Becomes Latest State to Enact Bail Reform, EJI (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2Mlp823; see also Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State to End
Cash Bail After 40 Year Fight, N.P.R. (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://n.pr/2FQYDjX.
167. See Devin Kelly, Alaska courts are now using a computer algorithm in bail
decisions, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2018), https://bit.ly/2FN28b2.
168. See Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State to End Cash Bail After 40
Year Fight, NPR (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://n.pr/2FQYDjX.
169. See generally Justin Jouvenal, Virginia Attorney General Calls for Reforming
State’s Bond System, WASH. POST, (Oct. 21, 2018), https://wapo.st/2E2laZw.
170. Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 3.
171. See Rebecca Ibarra, Crime Rates Plunge in New Jersey, and Bail Reform
Advocates Are Gloating, WNYC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RXe0NX.
172. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
173. See infra Section III.C.
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A. Adopting New Jersey’s PSA will Reduce the Pretrial Jail
Population
Between January 1, 2015, and January 1, 2018, “statistics show[ed]
a reduction of the pretrial jail population [in New Jersey] by . . . 35%.”174
This reduction can be attributed to the CJRA and its movement away from
cash bail.175 Meeting cash bail requirements often takes significant time
and can lead to sporadic results, such as creating undue pressure for
defendants to plead guilty for the sole purpose of leaving jail.176 New
Jersey’s system, however, has shown that 99.5% of defendants will know
whether they will be released within 48 hours of incarceration.177 New
Jersey’s streamlined process holds defendants who commit violent crimes
but allows less dangerous defendants to await trial at home rather than in
a jail cell.178
1. Cash Bail Increases the Pretrial Jail Population
Under the common bail system, after being arrested, the defendant
must wait for a bail hearing to learn the amount of cash bail needed to be
released and then find a means to pay.179 When defendants are unable to
pay the cash bail amount many resort to desperation: such as “plead[ing]
guilty in order to exit jail.”180 Indigent detainees face mounting daily
pressures such as losing a job for failing to arrive at work, housing, and
even custody of children when they cannot pay cash bail.181
Especially in misdemeanor cases, pleading guilty often means that
defendants can exit jail based on time served or probation.182 Simply put,
financial pressures sometimes encourages innocent defendants to plead
174. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4.
175. Id. (“Considering the entire universe of 142,663 complaint-summons and
complaint-warrants filed in 2017, and the 8,043 defendants actually detained, the rate of
pretrial release is 94.2% and pretrial detention is actually 5.6% of all defendants issued
complaints in 2017.”).
176. See Scott Shackford, Garden State Crime is Down Since New Jersey Ditched
Cash Bail, REASON (Dec. 6, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://bit.ly/2AXEm8O.
177. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 13 (“[F]or eligible
defendants for whom the prosecutor did not file a detention motion, courts made release
decisions for 81.3% within 24 hours and 99.5% within 48 hours.”); see also Michael P.
Jacobson & Reagan Daly, How To Release Jail Populations in Big Ways,
GOVERNING.COM, https://bit.ly/2utxe0b (last visited Jan. 18, 2019) (Defendants “who
spend even two days in pretrial detention are significantly more likely to recidivate after
their cases are decided.”).
178. See supra Section II.C.
179. See Schuppe, supra note 4.
180. See Shackford, supra note 176.
181. See id.
182. See PAUL HEATON ET AL., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017).
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guilty when they otherwise would go to trial to prove their innocence.183
Consequently, pretrial detention is “especially likely” to prompt wrongful
guilty pleas.184 To avoid even the possibility of an innocent defendant
pleading guilty, a streamlined pretrial process to evaluate defendants
quickly and adequately ensures fair treatment of all defendants irrespective
of wealth. The PSA has successfully accomplished this goal.185
2. The PSA Decreases the Pretrial Jail Population
Presently, 99.5% of all arrested individuals received pretrial
detainment hearings within 48 hours of arrest.186 Upon arrest, Pretrial
Services evaluates a defendant’s FTA and NCA scores and NVCA flag.187
Pretrial Services then makes their pretrial recommendation and a hearing
occurs within 24 to 48 hours, including weekends due to virtual courts.188
With the creation of virtual courts, a defendant charged with a non-violent
crime can be arrested on a Friday evening and be back with their family
by Sunday.189
Additionally, the PSA conforms to the United States’ presumption of
innocence.190 The elimination of cash bail and a prompt pretrial release
determination ensures that innocent defendants do not plead guilty for the
sole purpose of returning home.191 Eliminating cash bail and instituting a
more efficient pretrial release system also ensures that the defendants who
are unlikely to commit additional crimes are released with certain
conditions and reduces unnecessary costs of incarceration for taxpayers.192
In New Jersey, indigent defendants are no longer in jail merely
because they lack financial resources.193 Moreover, wealthy defendants no
longer have the option to buy their way out of prison after committing
murder.194 Currently, individuals “charged with felonies make up more
183. See id. at 715.
184. Id. at 716.
185. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
186. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4.
187. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
188. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4, 24; see also Keith B.
Kaplan, Will Virtual Courts Create Courthouse Relics?, 52 No. 2 Judges’ J. 32, 32
(2013) (“A virtual court is a conceptual idea of a judicial forum that has no physical
presence but still provides the same justice services that are available in courthouses.”).
189. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 24.
190. See Ariana Tanoos, Shielding the Presumption of Innocence from Pretrial
Media Coverage, 50 IND. L. REV. 997, 999 (2017) (“The presumption of innocence is
derived from the ancient maxim that the accuser must prove the guilt of the accused
before the accused can be punished.”).
191. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text.
192. See Shackford, supra note 176 and accompanying text.
193. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 7.
194. See id.
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than two-thirds of the jail population nationwide.”195 Hence,
approximately one-third of the prisoners are charged with
misdemeanors.196 If all states follow New Jersey and adopt the PSA, then
states can release these “minimal risk” misdemeanor defendants, which
would result in a significant drop in the jail population nationwide.197
B.

Adoption of New Jersey’s PSA Will Reduce the Crime Rate

The most prominent critics of bail reform, the bail bonds industry,198
argue that crimes would increase because the state would “unleash[]
dangerous criminals back onto the streets.”199 But in the two years since
the CJRA was enacted, the crime rate in New Jersey has “plummeted
across the board.”200 In fact, “total violent crime [in New Jersey] is down
more than 30%.”201 While this significant drop in crime may not be
directly attributable to the CJRA, the static factors analyzed for the PSA
keep violent, repeat offenders behind bars.202
The CJRA addresses two factors that contribute to the decrease in the
crime rate. First, defendants that commit violent crimes, from homicide to
carjacking, are uniformly ineligible for release. Second, the NCA score
and NVCA flag uniformly screen individuals who have prior criminal
convictions and violent offenses.203
The key to reducing crime is uniformity. The PSA applies the same
factors to create an NCA score and NVCA flag the same way each time.204
The judge determines on what grounds to release a defendant using the

195. Jacobson & Daly, supra note 177.
196. See id.
197. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 7; see also supra notes
195–96 and accompanying text.
198. The CJRA is causing the bail bonds industry to go bankrupt due to the
effective elimination of cash bail. See Michaelangelo Conte, Bail Reform is Killing Our
Business, Bail Bondsmen Say, NJ.COM (Jan. 11, 2017), https://bit.ly/2sDXIvo.
199. See NJ Bail Reform Survives on Federal Appeal, NORTHJERSEY.COM (July 11,
2018, 4:03 P.M.), https://njersy.co/2usUtaF.
200. Star-Ledger Editorial Board, Has Bail Reform Been A Success? Check the
Crime Numbers, Then Decide, NJ.COM (Dec. 4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RB38WN.
201. See id. “State Police statistics show that compared to 2016 data (January to
September), homicides are down 32% in the same period for 2018.” Id. Furthermore,
rapes are down 13% in the same period for 2018; robberies are down 37% in the same
period for 2018; assaults are down 18% in the same period for 2018; and burglaries are
down 30% in the same period for 2018. See id.; see also DEP’T OF LAW AND PUB. SAFETY
DIV. OF STATE POLICE, UNIF. CRIME REPORTING UNIT (2018).
202. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
203. For example, a person who is charged with a violent offense, has a prior
conviction and is under the age of 20 will receive an NVCA flag and is extremely likely
to stay in jail pending trial. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
204. See supra Section II.C.
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uniform DMF Matrix, which applies to every judge in the state.205 If the
judge decides to release a defendant, then the prosecutor has the option to
appeal.206
Of the other states that use a predominantly cash bail system,
however, no state currently applies risk factors to a decision-making
framework similar to the PSA.207 Instead, a judge typically analyzes
statutory factors that are not quantifiable to reach a decision on monetary
bail.208 Pretrial Risk Services’ utilization of the PSA and DMF guarantees
uniformity in its application towards all defendants.209
Implementing the PSA will likely reduce the crime rate for all states
while providing uniformity to judicial decision-making. The crime rate is
down in New Jersey following the enactment of the CJRA which addresses
whether a defendant will commit another crime while out on bail.210
Judicial discretion in cash bail decision-making can be inherently much
more inconsistent.211 Further, cash bail, unlike the PSA, is not backed by
empirical data.212 Therefore, defendants awaiting pretrial release (or
detention) in state courts will be assessed by their criminal history and risk
level rather than the size of their wallets.
C.

States Should Evaluate Factors to Address Changes in
Crime

States that adopt bail reform similar to New Jersey’s system should
regularly re-evaluate static risk factors in order to better evaluate
individuals and crimes.213 Risk Assessment Instruments are relatively new
tools used to predict a defendant’s likelihood to appear in court and risk of
205. See supra Section II.D.
206. See supra Section II.E. Of the “19,366 motions for pretrial detention . . . the
court ordered 8,043 [of those] defendants detained.” See Criminal Justice Reform Report,
supra note 77, at 4.
207. See James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and
Defining the Elusive Meaning of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & Pol’y 637, 654–56 (2017)
(“[Bail] procedural schemes are now executed in starkly different manners across states,
and their varying results . . . have been criticized for possibly interfering . . . in assigning
accurate bail amounts.”).
208. See id. at 655.
209. See supra Sections II.C., II.D.
210. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
211. See John S. Goldcamp & Michael R. Gottfredson, Bail Decisionmaking and
Pretrial Detention, L. & HUM. BEHAV., 3, 4 (1979) (“A finding of special significance is
that a large proportion of [bail decisions] could not be explained systematically (i.e., a
large share of variance remain[s] unexplained).”).
212. See Allen, supra note 207, at 655.
213. Factors such as “[t]he defendant’s physical condition . . . [f]amily ties . . . [and]
[c]ommunity ties” have not been found to have a strong relationship with empirically
validated risk factors. Myburgh et al., supra note 26, at 57. Therefore, those factors
should not be considered. See id.
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committing crimes while on release.214 Despite the Arnold Foundation’s215
assembly of more than “1.5 million cases from approximately 300
jurisdictions across the United States,”216 the PSA solely uses static risk
factors as opposed to dynamic risk factors.217 While it is premature to
invoke dynamic risk factors in Risk Assessment Instruments like the PSA,
future studies may change the way Risk Assessment Instruments use static
and dynamic factors.218
Static risk factors “are only moderately accurate in the prediction of
future violence.”219 Dynamic risk factors, however, “are valuable
predictors of recidivism . . . [and] they can serve as an important
methodological function in identifying the causes of crime and
reoffending.”220
Successful implementation of dynamic risk factors can improve the
PSA in several ways. First, dynamic risk factors allow for a mechanism
that does not entirely focus on a defendant’s criminal history.221 Second,
dynamic risk factors may address issues that the PSA does not adequately
address, such as predicting behavior associated with domestic violence.222
The PSA focuses entirely on a defendant’s criminal history, which is
only one of four empirically-supportive focus groups of predictive static
factors.223 The four focus groups of static factors include: (1) individual
factors, such as age, gender, ethnicity, substance abuse, and mental health
status; (2) economic factors, such as education level, employment status,
and financial resources; (3) social factors, such as residential stability,
marital status, and availability of guarantors; and (4) criminal factors, such
as criminal history, past release failures and current criminal
214. The PSA was created in 2013. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
215. The Arnold Foundation is a philanthropy which focuses on criminal justice
reform in areas such as policing, pretrial justice, community supervision, prisons, and reintegration of prisoners. Criminal Justice, ARNOLD VENTURES, https://bit.ly/2G60Gk6
(last visited June 23, 2019).
216. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28.
217. Dynamic risk factors are factors that change based on changing lifetime
circumstances. See J.W. Coid et al., Improving Risk Management for Violence in Mental
Health Services: A Multimethods Approach, 4 PROGRAMME GRANTS FOR APPLIED RES.,
Nov. 2016, at 1, 255. Examples of dynamic risk factors are homelessness and eviction.
See id. at 256.
218. See id. at 255. (“Further investigation is . . . needed into the relationship
between static and dynamic risk for future intervention.”).
219. See id.
220. Tony Ward & Clare-Anne Fortune, The Role of Dynamic Risk Factors in the
Explanation of Offending, 29 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV., July–Aug. 2016, at 79, 79
(emphasis omitted).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 223–26.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 227–30.
223. See Myburgh et al., supra note 26, at iv; see also Public Safety Assessment,
supra note 28.
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involvement.224 The PSA does not include individual factors other than
age and completely ignores economic factors and social factors.225 Unlike
static factors, dynamic factors may address individual circumstances aside
from character traits to predict the likelihood of appearance and the
likelihood of violence.226
The PSA also fails to address specific issues of domestic violence.227
Some of these issues include “show[ing] signs of escalating violence,
changes in behavior, and whether they have a history of weapon use.”228
Interestingly, dynamic factors may better evaluate signs of escalating
violence and changes in behavior associated with domestic violence.229
Specifically, dynamic factors such as anxiety, homelessness, and
alcoholism may be indicative of domestic violence.230
If studies can effectively analyze key dynamic factors as a means of
predicting criminal behavior, such as domestic violence, then foundations
such as the Arnold Foundation should incorporate these factors into Risk
Assessment Instruments such as the PSA.231 Therefore, re-evaluation of
the PSA every three to five years is essential to address additional concerns
facing the community.232

224. See id.
225. See supra Section II.C.
226. For a study using dynamic risk factors in an attempt to predict likelihood of
violence, robbery, drugs and acquisitive crime, see Coid, supra note 217, at 255.
227. See Free to Kill? NJ Bail Reform Can Leave Victims Exposed, NJ1015.COM
(Feb. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RCgXnQ. Nicole Morella of the New Jersey coalition to
End Domestic Violence states “that the current system to determine whether a defendant
is kept in custody does not consider several factors that are different from other violent
criminals.” Id.
228. Id. “[T]he court . . . [should] consider the victim’s situation after the violence
occurs, including whether they plan on trying to get out of the relationship.” Id.
229. See Coid, supra note 217, at 255.
230. See id.
231. See Myburgh et al., supra note 26, at v.
232. See id. (“It is recommended that [Risk Assessment Instruments] be reevaluated every three to five years . . . [as] [r]e-validation is necessary, especially to
ensure the quality of the instrument and the validity of the constructs.”).
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
Waiting and evaluating other states’ statutes before enacting bail
reform is not an ideal solution. Defendants across the country are sitting
in jail because they cannot afford cash bail.233 Legislators and judiciaries
across the country should promptly adopt the PSA and DMF.234
Two years have passed since New Jersey enacted the CJRA.235 In that
time, the pretrial jail population has decreased.236 Defendants charged with
violent crimes remain in jail and indigent defendants who have committed
less serious crimes are released.237 Further, the crime rate has dropped.
While the PSA is not a perfect Risk Assessment Instrument, it can be reanalyzed and adjusted to reflect changing societal standards.238 Moreover,
the decline in prison population and decline in crime rate show that bail
reform acts, such as the CJRA, are an effective solution to problems
associated with cash bail.239 States across the country should follow New
Jersey’s model.
V.

CONCLUSION

Bail reform involving Risk Assessment Instruments is a new way of
addressing the problem of defendants being incarcerated for the sole
reason that they cannot afford monetary bail.240 The solution for New
Jersey was the CJRA, which incorporated a Risk Assessment Instrument
called the PSA.241 The PSA analyzes predetermined static factors which
address the risks that(1) a defendant fails to appear in court; (2) a defendant
is a danger to the community; and (3) that a defendant will obstruct the
criminal justice process.242 The PSA scores are then applied to a DMF,
which recommends conditions of pretrial release.243
Critics of the CJRA have argued that the crime rate would increase
because the same defendants would re-commit crimes while out on bail.244
Yet two years after the CJRA’s enactment, indigent defendants in New
Jersey have proven the critics wrong.245 The pretrial jail population has
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See Heaton, supra note 182, at 711.
See supra Section II.A.
See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4.
See supra Sections II.C., II.D.
See supra Sections III.A., III.B.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Sections III.A., III.B.
See supra Part I; see also supra Sections II.A., II.B.
See supra Sections II.A., II.B., II.C.
See supra Sections II.C.1., II.C.2., II.C.3.
See supra Sections II.D.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
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fallen drastically along with a decrease in crime.246 Further, the CJRA has
ensured that individuals who commit the most heinous crimes, like
murder, cannot pay to be released from jail.247 Meanwhile, no one in the
state of New Jersey is awaiting trial in jail for the sole reason they lack the
financial means to leave.248
While states such as Alaska and California have made progress in
bail reform, other states should follow suit and use New Jersey as a
model.249 Enacting laws like New Jersey’s CJRA in states across the
country would ensure that individuals are assessed by their likelihood of
appearing in court and re-offending rather than the depths of their bank
account.250 In return for reforming their bail systems, states will not only
see their pretrial jail population decrease substantially, but also experience
a decline in crime overall.251
Risk Assessment Instruments like the PSA predict future behavior
and therefore are imperfect.252 There will inevitably be situations where
released defendants fail to appear in court and re-commit crimes they
otherwise would not have committed under a cash bail system.253
Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence should underly criminal
procedure legislation.254 By enacting the CJRA, New Jersey demonstrated
a better way to abate the risk of violent defendants while upholding our
country’s most critical value.255 A defendant will be presumed innocent
until proven guilty—not indigent.
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See supra Sections III.A., III.B.
See supra Sections II.A., II.B.
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